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The reduction of novice drivers’
accidents requires improved perception
and reduced acceptance of risk
Les accidents de jeunes conducteurs peuvent être prévenus par une amélioration





1 We know that beginner drivers are overrepresented in national road accident statistics.
Drivers  under  age 25 commonly account  for  about  twice  as  many accidents  as  their
proportion in the total driver population, while their accident involvement diminishes
with every additional year of driving (Mayhew, Simpson & Pak, 2003; Claret & al., 2003;
Shope & Bingham, 2008). We know, too, that about one-half of the overrepresentation of
novice drivers in the accident statistics is due to inexperience,  and the other half  to
characteristics associated with being young (Select Committee, 1977). Lack of experience
implies a lower level of driving skill; we will argue here that this is largely due to (a) a
salient deficiency in the ability of beginner drivers to recognize risk as more experienced
drivers do (Pradhan, Pollatsek, Knodle & Fisher, 2009), and (b) overconfidence in their
ability to handle the challenges to their safety; and not to their limited vehicle-handling
skills. We, therefore, first describe a teaching technique to help accelerate the acquisition
of risk-perception skills in novice drivers.
2 Secondly, we argue – as we have done elsewhere (Wilde, 1997, 2012) – that the age-related
overrepresentation of young drivers in the accident statistics is due to a higher-than-
average level  of  willingness to rake risks.  We discuss the major determinants of  risk
acceptance and present incentives for accident-free performance as the most effective
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method  for  bringing  down  the  accepted  level  of  risk  while  driving,  and  thus  the
frequency of accidents.
 
1. Requirements for keeping accident risk at the level
accepted
3 There is a hierarchical set of conditions that must be fulfilled for a driver to reduce the
likelihood of a potential accident due to his or her own doing (see Figure 1). Obviously, (1)
the driver must be awake. But to be awake is not enough. A driver may well be fully
awake,  yet  inattentive  to  the  driving  task  and paying  attention to  other  things,  for
instance, the cellular telephone, the radio or conversation with a passenger. 
4 Thus, (2) the driver must also be attentive to the traffic situation. But paying attention to
the traffic situation is not enough, because the driver may not have the sensory abilities
(vision and hearing, among other things) to clearly perceive the danger-relevant features
of the traffic situation. 
5 Thus,  (3)  the  driver  must  also  have  the  necessary  sensory  abilities.  But  having  the
necessary sensory acuity is not enough, because the driver may fail to be aware of the
amount  of  risk  that  is  contained  in  the  traffic  situation  he  or  she  perceives.  Risk
perception,  like  the  percep tion of  beauty,  is  a  product  of  experience  and reasoning,
however rudimentary, intuitive or subconscious these may be. 
6 Thus, (4) the driver also has to be able to infer the amount of accident risk that is con 
tained in the traffic situation. But risk recognition is not enough, be cause, for the driver
to  be  motivated  to  take  action  to  reduce  the  acci dent  risk,  the  amount  of  risk
acknowledged must be greater than the level of risk the driver is willing to accept. 
7 A further condition is, then, that (5) the risk must be greater than the driver is willing to
tolerate. But the wish to reduce the risk is not sufficient, because the driver may or may
not have the ability to decide what should be done in order to reduce the risk. 
8 Therefore, (6) the driver also has to have the necessary decision-making skill for risk
reduction. But to have the decision-making skill is not enough, because even the driver
who knows what ought to be done may not have the vehicle-handling skill to carry out
the necessary manœuvre. Hence, (7) the driver must also have the necessary vehicle-
control skill.
9 If all of the above conditions are fulfilled, the driver may be called “safe”, meaning that
his or her actual risk is equal to,  or smaller than, the level of acceptable risk in the
driver’s own judgement; and thus the driver feels “safe enough.” One logical implication
of this reasoning is that the average accident risk actually incurred by the collective of
road users  equals  the  average level  of  accident  risk  they find acceptable,  unless,  on
average, they either overestimate or underestimate actual accident risk.
10 This,  in  fact,  is  a  major  contention  of  risk  homeostasis  theory  (Wilde,  1982,  1988,
2001,2012), but this theory will not be the central focus of discussion in this presentation.
Instead,  we will  focus on its  implications for  educational  efforts  aimed at  improving
novice drivers’ perception of actual risk through driver training and with motivational
interventions intended to lower their level of accepted risk by means of safety incentive
programmes.
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Figure 1: Requirements drivers must fulfill to keep accident risk at the level they accept, i.e., “safe
enough.”
11 The simple logic presented in Figure 1 might suggest that there are as many as seven
different factors involved in accident avoidance. That this is a miscon ception, however,
becomes apparent when one reads Figure 1 from the bottom up and realizes that these
factors do not operate independently of one another. If a person’s vehicle-handling or
decision-making skills are poor, that person’s level of perceived risk should be high, and
if it is not, this reflects overconfidence in one’s skills. The same holds for sensory abilities.
To be colour-blind or hard of hearing does not imply a significant increase in accident
liability, provided the driver considers these handicaps in the estimation of risk. Poor
night vision will not increase a person’s accident risk unless the person is unaware of it or
is willing to accept high levels of accident risk by driving in the dark. Deficiencies in skills
and sensory functioning, all other things being equal, can increase a per son’s accident
likelihood only to the extent that these deficiencies are underestimated by the person in
question, and thus lead to an in appropriately low level of perceived risk. Several authors
have stressed the critical importance of the driver being able to correctly assess his or
her own competence at the driving task (e.g., Brown, Groeger & Biehl, 1988; Kuiken &
Twisk, 2001). 
12 Poor skill will not enhance a person’s accident risk if that person is fully aware of his or
her poor skill, because—risk acceptance level being the same—that person is less likely to
engage in manœuvres he or she cannot handle very well. It is not surprising, therefore,
that  sensory abilities  and other driving skills  have generally been found to show no
association, or very weak association, with accident involve ment (Shinar, 1978; Grayson &
Noordzij, 1990; Ball & al., 1993). 
13 Moreover, better-than-average driving skill may lead to worse-than-average accident like li 
hood, because the driver is being lulled into an illusion of safety. This factor is a common
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explanation for  the fact  that  better-than-average driver  training has  repeatedly  been
found to be followed by worse-than-average accident involvement in Canada, the US and
Europe  (Skelly,  1968;  Jonah,  Dawson  &  Bragg,  1982;  Lund  &  Williams,  1985;  Lund,
Williams, & Zador, 1986; Brown & al., 1988; Potvin, Champagne & Laberge-Nadeau, 1988).
As has been said by an Australian driver educator: “Strong motivation makes up for weak
skills better than strong skills make up for weak motivation. Without strong motivation
to reduce risk, advanced skills training can lead to more crashes, not fewer” (Jerrim,
1996). 
14 Similarly,  the  authors  of  a  Norwegian  study  not  only  found  that  mandatory  driver
training on slippery roads for truck drivers failed to reduce their accident risk, but also
that, according to some of the analyses, the accident risk actually increased as a result of
the course. As an explanation it was suggested “[...] that the course has a larger effect on
the [learners’] belief in their abilities of driving on slippery roads, than on their actual
abilities.”  (Christensen  &  Glad,  1996).  Approximately  20  years  earlier,  two  other
Norwegians had come to approximately the same conclusion (Marek & Sten, 1977). 
15 Inattentiveness  to  the  driving  task  is  undoubtedly  a  frequent  immediate  cause  of
accident,  but  is  it  also  a  root  cause?  Inattentiveness  implies  either  that  the  driver
estimated the risk of accident as very low and permitted himself or herself to pay more
attention  to  other  things,  or  that  the  driver  considered  other  things  to  be  at  least
temporarily more important than safety, thereby accepting a higher level of accident
risk. 
16 Finally,  lapses  in  wakefulness  during  driving  will  not  occur  unless  the  driver
underestimated or accepted the chances of falling asleep behind the wheel. Here again,
the underlying cause is either risk underestimation or increased risk acceptance.
17 It would thus appear that the seven factors in our original analysis shrink to only two
that are truly relevant to increased acci dent likelihood. Further, it would seem entirely
reasonable to expect that individuals with a very low risk acceptance will be motivated to
ensure that they do not underestimate risk. Consequently, only one dominant factor re 
mains: the level of risk acceptance. This is precisely the contention of risk homeostasis
theory (Wilde, 1988, 1994, 2001, 2013), sometimes known as risk compensation theory, or
among some economists as the “offsetting behaviour hypothesis” (Peterson,  Hoffer &
Millner, 1995).
 
2. Training of appropriate risk perception
18 From the above considerations it would seem obvious that driver risk perception and its
assessment by the teacher and improvement should have a centre stage position in the
design of driver education programmes. 
19 Driving educators may, however, have major difficulties in assessing the appropriateness
of a student’s risk perceptions. After all, these are “all in the head” of the student and not
necessarily obvious in his or her behaviour. During in-car training in traffic there are so
many things going on that it is not possible for the student to report to the educator on
everything she or he sees that is relevant to the driving. In fact, the teaching procedure,
called “commentary driving,” which requires the student do this quite demanding task,
may interfere with safe vehicle control when applied to beginning drivers. It is, therefore,
a useful educational technique, but only for drivers who are already experienced and
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have sufficient spare mental capacity to accomplish the task of making elaborate ongoing
commentaries (Marek & Sten, 1977). It is possible, however, to greatly simplify the task of
commentary driving for use with novice drivers, and it can be focused more sharply on
risk perception in particular. 
20 Trainee drivers are asked to rate the amount of risk they perceive at any time on a verbal
scale, e.g., from 1 to 7, where 1 means “zero collision risk” and 7 stands for “extremely
dangerous”. Students are instructed to continuously monitor the risk they perceive, but
to report to the instructor only when they perceive a change in risk, or when the teacher
asks what the rating is. Thus, the teacher (or the supervising parent; Gregersen, Nyberg &
Berg, 2003) has an opportunity to check the student’s hazard perception against his or
her own more expert evaluation and is thus in a position to address and correct any
discrepancies. 
21 The practice of ongoing rating of risk is readily performed by any driver and not at all
demanding. This is not surprising, because risk monitoring is what the driver is already
doing anyway – at least according to risk homeostasis theory –; it is an integral part of the
task of driving. What is different is merely that the driver is asked to verbally quantify
the  degree  of  risk  experienced  on  a  numerical  scale.  Various  studies  report  that
individual differences in verbal risk ratings show considerable between-rater reliability
when asked to assess the risk while driving road sections of greater or lower past accident
frequencies (Ganton & Wilde, 1971; Moran, 1983; Grant & Wilde, 1985; Wilde, 2012). Verbal
risk ratings while driving have been shown to be sensitive to traffic events and changes in
traffic configurations, variations in following distance and overtaking (Wilde & Niepold,
1973).
22 These ratings are also consistent with psycho-physiological functions that are indicative
of experienced fear.  Increases in risk ratings coincide with increases in the electrical
conductance of the skin without being confounded by any motor activity of the driver on
the vehicle controls, as records of electrical conductance of the skin tend to do (Heino,
van der Molen & Wilde, 1994). 
23 There is one study that involved verbal risk ratings that may well be particularly relevant
to driver education. In that study it was found that inexperienced drivers’ danger ratings
tend to  agree  more  with other  inexperienced drivers’  ratings  than with those  of  ex 
perienced drivers. Similarly, ratings by experienced drivers do agree more with those by
other experienced observers than they do with those of inexpe rienced drivers. In simpler
words: drivers of similar levels of experience show greater similarity in the amount of
risk they perceive (Ganton & Wilde, 1971). In a situation of traffic conflict,  therefore,
experienced  drivers  would  be  expected  to  be  better  able  to  predict  what  another
experienced driver  will  do  to  avoid  a  collision,  and thus  be  more  able  to  make the
appropriate crash-avoidance response on their own part. Similarly, inexperienced drivers
likely would predict the reactions of other inexperienced drivers more accurately than
they would predict those of experienced ones. 
24 Other  studies  have  also  noted that  there  are  differences  in  risk  perception between
younger  and  older  drivers.  Finn  & al.  (1986)  questioned  their  American  subjects  on
accident  involvement  and  had  them  rate  the  riskiness  of  traffic  situations  in  still
photographs as well as videotapes. Significant differences between the young and the
more experienced drivers were observed. This was also found to be true for the particular
contributing  factors  to  accidents  (Shope  &  Bingham,  2008).  Age  differences  in  risk
perception were also observed in Britain (Brown & Groeger, 1982). Delhomme & Meyer
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(1995) obtained similar results in France, and so did Tränkle, Gelau & Metker (1990) in
Germany, and Borowsky, Shinar & Oron-Gilad (2010) in Israel.
25 In addition, the fact that certain types of accidents are more typical for younger drivers
than for the driver population as a whole is well established (see e.g., Lonero & al., 1995;
Lam, 2003).
26 There  are  thus  plausible reasons  for  hypothesizing  that  the  accident  rate  of  novice
drivers would be lower if only novice drivers were making use of the roads. Apart from
the role played by inexperience per se, the experience mix in the collective of road users
would seem to contribute to accident likelihood. 
 
3. The reduction of risk acceptance 
27 While appropriate risk perception would seem desirable from a safety point of view, it
does  not  necessarily  lead  to  accident  reduction.  For  one  thing,  although training  in
hazard perception would be expected to lead to increases in the level of risk perceived by
many  drivers,  some  novice  drivers  might  learn  that  certain  traffic  situations  and
manœuvres are not as dangerous as they thought they were. Consequently, this subgroup
of  drivers might  expose  themselves  more  to  actual  danger  as  a  result  of  hazard
perception training and their accident rate would increase.
28 Further, and more importantly, it should be noted that to perceive a risk does not imply
that one will reject it. Whether this happens or not depends upon the level of risk the
driver is willing to accept, and this depends on the following four factors:
a. the  expected  benefits  of  risky  behaviour  alternatives (e.g.,  gaining  time  by  speeding,  longer
distances driven per time unit, sensation seeking, peer approval from the young, “macho”
image,  practice  “near  the  edge,”  reactance  –  that  is  the  inclination  to  go  against  the
established  rules  and  regulations  of  society  in  order  to  assert  one’s  psychological
independence and autonomy (Wilde, 2001, 2012, Section 11.2),
b. the  expected  costs  of  cautious  behaviour  alternatives (e.g.,  using  an  uncomfortable  seatbelt,
longer travel time, boredom, “wimpy” image, peer pressure problems, less practice “near
the edge”),
c. the expected benefits  of  cautious behaviour alternatives (e.g.,  avoiding damage and injury, an
insurance discount for accident-free driving, fuel and equipment savings), and 
d. the expected costs of risky behaviour alternatives (e.g., a fine for jumping a red light, a fine for
speeding, loss of safety awards, possible damage and injury, high fuel and equipment wear
costs).
29 The accepted (tolerated, preferred, desired) level of risk – also known as the “target level
of risk” (Wilde, 2001, 2012) – will increase as the weight of the first two factors increases,
and be reduced as the last two become more important: the traffic accident likelihood of
drivers will rise or fall accordingly. Any discrepancy that may occur between the amount
of risk drivers perceive and the amount of risk they accept serves as the “decision rule”
for taking either riskier or more cautious action (van der Molen & al., 1988; Tränkle &
Gelau, 1992). 
30 The target level is not fixed for all situations and all times (homeostasis being a process,
not an outcome), because it depends on variation in the four utility factors mentioned
above. It is obvious that these change by the state of the economy (Wilde, 2012, Chapter 5)
or can be modified by deliberate actions by insurance companies, governments or other
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safety  agencies.  Drivers’  motivation  to  avoid  accidents  can  be  enhanced  by
countermeasures that take the form of increasing the expected benefits of safe conduct,
as  well  as  by those that  enhance the expected costs  of  risky behaviour:  reward and
punishment in other words. But not all “motivational” countermeasures can be expected
to work towards greater safety, as we shall see. 
 
4. Safety incentive programmes 
31 In the last several decades, there has been a major increase in interest in the use of
incentives  for  accident-free  operation  as  an  approach  to  accident  prevention.  This
appears to be a truly international phenomenon: this author has seen reports on this
topic in Dutch, English, German, Norwegian, Spanish, Swedish and Russian. 
32 What explains this interest? On the one hand, one could cite the large and still increasing
amount of empirical evidence compiled in occupational, clinical and health psychology
that shows the fruitfulness of the behaviour modification approach to the treatment of
dysfunctional conduct and the shaping of desirable behaviours. On the other hand, one
could point at indications of growing disappointment with the traditional approaches to
accident prevention. Behaviour modification, with its focus upon motivation, is indeed
quite different from the traditional “Triple E” approach towards road and occupational
safety: Engineering, Education and Enforcement. Engineering can improve the opportunity
to  be  safe  and education can enhance  the  ability to  be  safe,  but  neither  necessarily
increases the desire to be safe. So, to the extent that safety is actually determined more by
the desire to be safe than by the physical opportunity that is offered or by the level of
skill,  the introduction of accident countermeasures of the traditional engineering and
education varieties cannot be expected to reduce the accident rate per head of population
(Wilde, 1988, 2001). 
33 Thus, the art of effective safety management appears to depend more upon the art of
effectively reducing the level of risk that people accept on the job, or on the road and
elsewhere rather than upon training or technology.
 
5. To reward or to punish?
34 The notion that safety may be enhanced by acting upon motivation has, of course, a long
history, as is clear from the universal presence of punitive law.
35 Although  enforcement  of  punitive  law  is  one  of  society’s  traditional  attempts  at
motivating people towards safety, past evidence of its effectiveness has been less than
overwhelming  (OECD,  1974;  Carr,  Schnelle  &  Kirchner,  1980;  Bonnie,  1985).  Even  if
selective enforcement can reduce the rate of a particular type of accident, e.g., drinking-
and-driving accidents, this does not imply a reduction in the overall accident rate as the
rate  of  sober  accidents  may increase (Rockerbie,  1980;  Wilde,  1990).  Some studies  of
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enforcement report more positive effects, but these are usually marginal in size, local in
scope, short-lived and expensive to implement (Mäkinen & al., 2003).
36 The approach that takes the form of punishing people for specific unsafe acts also suffers
from several  other  problems,  some of  which  have  been identified  in  the  context  of
organizational psychology (Arnold, 1989):
a. The  “self-fulfilling  prophecy”  of  attribution:  labelling  people  with  undesirable
characteristics  may stimulate  individuals  to  behave  as  if  they  had these  characteristics.
Thus, calling some people bad drivers may provoke some people to drive more poorly than
they otherwise would.
b. The emphasis is on process controls, i.e., on specific behaviours, like using a piece of safety
equipment or obeying the speed limit, instead of focusing on outcome: safety, that is, having
no accident. Process controls are cumbersome to design and costly to implement. Moreover,
process  controls  can  never  be  totally  exhaustive  (i.e.,  cover  all  undesirable  specific
behaviours of all people at all time).
c. Punishment brings negative side effects. Punishment creates a dysfunctional organizational
or social climate: resentment, uncooperativeness, antagonism, and sabotage. As a result, the
very  behaviour  that  was  to  be  prevented  may in  fact  be  stimulated.  Here  we meet  the
phenomenon of  reactance again.  As  it  is  particularly  characteristic  of  the young (Hong,
Giannakopoulos, Laing & Williams, 1994), care should be taken not to provoke it in this age
group.
37 In contrast, incentive programmes have both the effect for which they are intended as
well as the positive side effect of creating a more favourable social climate (Steers &
Porter,  1991).  Their  effectiveness  in  enhancing  safety  is  clearly  established  (Komaki,
Barwick & Scott, 1978; Haynes, Pine & Fitch, 1982; Wilde, 1985; Fox, Hopkins & Anger,
1987; McAfee & Winn, 1989).
38 In a review of over 53 published evaluations of different types of occupational accident
prevention,  incentives  were generally  found more effective in enhancing safety than
were engineering improvements,  personnel selection, and other types of intervention
which included disciplinary action, special licensing, and exercise and stress reduction
programmes (Guastello, 1993). 
 
6. Cost-effectiveness of incentive programmes
39 Accident reductions per head decreased to fractions between 50% and 20% of base rate
are  not  uncommon in  manufacturing,  construction and other  industry.  In  passing it
should  be  noted  that  some  51 %  of  all  industrial  accidents  occur  on  the  roads
(Takala,1999) and thus that accident prevention efforts in the world of occupational and
traffic safety should not be separated as if they were two totally different domains. The
ratios  between  benefits  (savings  on  accidents  prevented)  and  programme  costs  are
usually greater than 2 to 1, meaning that industrial companies can make money on such
accident prevention efforts (this is largely due to reduced fees to workers’ compensation
boards  and  other  insurance  in  jurisdictions  where  insurance  fees  depend  to  the
company’s own accident record and not of that of the average record of the industry
branch to which the company belongs). 
40 These favourable effects endure over time. Incentive plans in two American mines were
studied over periods of 11 and 12 years. In one mine the number of days lost due to
accidents was reduced to about 11 % of baseline, and in another, to about 2 %. Benefit/
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cost ratios varied from year to year between 18 and 28 at one mine and between 13 and 21
at the other. There was no sign that the effectiveness of the incentive plans diminished
over time at either mine (Fox & al., 1987). Very high benefit/cost ratios have also been
reported by others (e.g., Greenberg & Baron, 1997). 
41 Incentive programmes usually meet with approval from the people to whom they are
addressed and in this respect, they compare favourably with the much less popular action
of the law and of the police. To put it popularly: a small carrot is not only much better
liked than a big stick. It is also much more effective. Only one negative side effect has
been noticed so far, and that is the tendency of people to under-report accidents when
incentive programmes are in effect. Fortunately, however, such underreporting has been
found to occur with respect to minor accidents only (McAfee & Winn, 1989). It is easy to
conceal a minor mishap, not so a dead body.
 
7. Requirements for effective incentive programming
42 Past  experience  with  incentive  programmes  shows  that  some programmes  have  had
much greater impact than others. For instance, a German incentive plan, which promised
professional  truck and van drivers  a  bonus  of  DM 350  for  each half-year  of  driving
without being at fault in an accident, produced a reduction in direct accident cost to less
than one-third in the first year of application and remained at that level for over three
decades (Gros, 1989). In the California “good driver” experiment, in which drivers in the
general population were offered free extension of their driver’s licence by one year in
return for each year of accident-free driving, the accident rate dropped by 22 % in the
first year of the programme, while the effect was particularly marked among young drivers
(Harano & Hubert,  1974).  Accident  reduction by as  much as  35 % was achieved by a
Norwegian  incentive  program  that  offered  rebates  plus  interest  for  accident-free
beginner drivers (Vaaje, 1991). Thus, the need arises to identify the distinctive features of
the more successful incentive schemes.
43 The following are among the typical features of the more effective incentive plans in the
various  published  reports  (bibliographic  sources  may  be  found  in  the  following
references:  Wilde & Murdoch,  1982;  Wilde,  1985;  McAfee & Winn,  1989;  Peters,  1991;
Guastello, 1993; Wilde, 2001). 
44 7.1.  Leadership.  Incentive  programmes  should  be  introduced  and  maintained  with
vigour, commitment and coherence. Workers or drivers should not only be informed of
the  programme  in  existence,  but  they  should  also  frequently  be  reminded  of  it  in
attention-catching ways.
45 7.2. Operator participation in programme design.  The incentive scheme should be
developed in cooperation and consultation with those people to whom it will be applied.
People are more likely to actually strive for goals they have helped define themselves
(Latham & Baldes, 1975; Komaki & al., 1978). As the perceptions, values and motivations
of the young differ from the population as a whole, care must be taken that these are
accounted for in programme design. An incentive can only be an incentive to the extent
that it is being experienced as an incentive by the target group. An “imposed” reward
programme may lead to reactance and thus be counterproductive to safety.
46 7.3. Rewarding the non-occurrence of accidents, not the occurrence of a particular
behavior. Incentive programmes should reward the outcome variable, the “bottom line”
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– the fact of not having caused an accident – not some process variable like wearing the
seatbelt or helmet, driving when sober, obeying the speed limit, wearing safety glasses or
hearing  protection  (as  described,  for  instance,  by  Zohar,  1980).  Rewarding  specific
behaviours  does  not  necessarily  strengthen  the  motivation  towards  safety,  and  a
potential  safety  benefit  due  to an increased frequency of  one  specific  form of  ‘safe’
behaviour may simply be offset by road users less frequently displaying other forms of
“safe” acting. “The risk is here that while the rewarded behavior may improve, other
related safe behaviors may deteriorate.”( McAfee & Winn,1989). 
47 7.4 Attractive awards. Incentive programmes can be expected to be more successful to
the extent that they widen the utility difference between the perceived benefit of not
having an accident and the perceived disadvantage of having an accident. Rewards for
accident-free operation in industry have taken many different forms, ranging from cash
to public commendation. They include trading stamps, lottery tickets, gift certificates,
shares of company stock, extra holidays and other privileges.
48 Drivers have been rewarded with cash (Gros, 1989), automobile insurance rebates (Vaaje,
1991) and free licence renewal (Harano & Hubert, 1974). 
49 Awards do not have to be very large to be effective.  In fact,  a case can be made for
relatively  small  awards  being preferable.  Small  awards  make it  possible  to  hand out
awards  more  frequently,  they  are  probably  less  conducive  to  under-reporting  of
accidents, and they may foster the internalization of pro-safety attitudes through the
process  of  “cognitive  dissonance  reduction.”  (Geller,  1990).  When  a  modest  reward
changes a person’s behaviour, that person may justify that change by reasoning that the
change was for safety’s sake rather than due to the insignificant inducement. No such
internalization  of  pro-safety  attitudes  is  necessary  when the  external  inducement  is
large, because in that case it fully justifies the behaviour change. It should be noted,
however, that the attitude-shaping effect of modest awards can only take place after the
operators have changed their behaviour for whatever minor external inducement. So, the
award should be big enough to achieve some behaviour change to begin with (Gregersen
& al., 1996). 
50 In some cases a small material reward might imply a major social reward because of its
“symbolic function” (Markus, 1990). Safe behaviour may thus become the “right thing to
do” and add to the social status on those who behave safely. This might help explain why
a modest incentive,  such as the free licence renewal for one year,  produced a major
reduction in the accident rate of California drivers (Harano & Hubert, 1974). With respect
to the accident likelihood of novice drivers, it is also of special interest to note that this
intervention had the largest effect upon young motorists (i.e., those under 25 year of age).
To behave safely may have become less “sissy” in their eyes and more “sensible”. 
51 7.5. Progressive accumulation of safety credits. The amount of the incentive should
continue to grow progressively as the individual operator accumulates a larger number of
uninterrupted  accident-free  periods;  e.g.,  the  bonus  for  10  uninterrupted  years  of
accident-free driving should be greater than 10 times the bonus for one year of accident-
free driving (Wilde & Murdoch, 1982).
52 In Ontario,  Canada,  as  well  as  in some other jurisdictions,  it  is  common practice for
insurance companies  to offer  fee discounts  of  increasing amounts,  as  the number of
claim-free  years  increase.  But  this  is  true  only  for  up  to  five  years  of  accident-free
driving, as if such discounts would have no accident-reducing effect beyond that period.
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What may be worse from the point of view of accident prevention is that drivers with five
or  more fault-free  years  who have a  subsequent  culpable  accident,  are  not  likely  to
actually incur an increase in insurance fees. The reason for an insurance company to have
this  “forgiveness  clause”  would  seem to  be  that  the  driver  in  question is  seen as  a
relatively “good risk” whose business would be sadly missed if it went to the competition.
This practice, however, fails to bring the accident rate down to a level as low as it could
have been otherwise.
53 7.6. Bonuses perceived as equitable. Those to whom it is addressed should perceive the
incentive programme as equitable. The bonus should be such that it is viewed as a just
reward for not causing an accident in a given time period. As chance plays a part in
having or not having an accident, the actual receipt of the award may be made to depend
upon the additional requirement that the accident-free driver in question also has no
demerit points. 
54 7.7. Bonuses perceived as accessible.  Programmes should be designed such that the
bonus is viewed as realistically attainable and not beyond reach. This is of particular
importance  if  the  bonus  is  awarded  in  a  lottery  system.  Although lotteries  make  it
possible to hand out greater awards, thus enhancing the attention-getting appeal of an
incentive programme, fewer among the people who have accumulated the safety credit
will receive the bonus. This, in turn, may discourage some people from making an active
attempt to accumulate the safety credit to begin with (Bartels, 1974).
55 7.8. Short incubation periods. The specified time period in which the individual has to
remain accident-free in order to be eligible for the bonus should be kept relatively short.
Delayed  rewards  and  penalties  tend  to  be  discounted  and  are  thus  less  effective  in
shaping behaviour than more immediate consequences. Periods as short as one month
have been used in  industry.  In  the  cited California  experiment,  those  drivers  whose
licenses  were  coming  up  for  renewal  within  one  year  after  being  informed  of  the
incentive programme showed a greater reduction in accident rate than was true for
people whose licenses did not have to be renewed until two or three years later.
56 7.9. Simple rules. The operational rules of the programme should be kept simple so that
they are easily understood by all persons to whom the programme applies.
57 7.10.  Rewarding group as  well  as  individual  performance.  Incentive  programmes
should  be  designed such that  they  strengthen peer  pressure towards  the  objective  of
having no accident. Thus, the plan should not only stimulate each individual operator’s
concern for her or his own safety, but also motivate her or him to influence peers so that
their  accident  likelihood  is  also  reduced.  In  industrial  settings  this  is  achieved  by
extending a bonus for accident-free performance of the work team in addition to the
bonus for individual freedom of accidents, and the team bonus has been found to increase
the competitive motivation towards winning the team award.  In the context  of  road
safety,  this  can be  achieved by  pitting  all  (young)  drivers  in  one  age  group against
another  age  group  in  the  same  community,  or  by  organizing  a  safety  competition
between cities. Team awards add a material incentive to the motivation to act as “one’s
brother’s and sister’s keeper”.
58 7.11. Rewarding multiple levels within the social structure. In industrial settings, not
only  are  shop  floor  workers  to  be  rewarded  for  safe  performance,  but  also  their
supervisors and middle managers.  This creates a more cohesive and pervasive safety
orientation, also known as a “safety culture” (Guldenmund, 2000) within a company (Fox
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& al., 1987; Bacher, 1989; Bruening, 1989; Synett, 1992). Thus, several links in the “line of
command”  should  be  made  eligible  for  an  award,  not  only  those  who  stay  out  of
accidents, but also those who are responsible for those who stay out of accidents. This
consideration may have particular implication for the trucking industry (Rothe, 1991) as
well as for safety competitions between different school boards, towns and cities.
59 7.12. Prevention of accident under-reporting. Thought should be given to the question
of how to counteract operators’ tendency not to report the accidents they have. That the
institution of incentive programmes may stimulate that tendency seems to be the only
currently identified negative side effect of such programmes (while occasionally moral
objections have been raised against rewarding people for obtaining a goal they should
aspire to on their own, without being “bribed into safety”). Some incentive programmes
have clauses providing for deduction of safety credits in case accidents are not reported
(Fox & al., 1987).
60 7.13. Maximization of accident reduction versus maximizing benefit/cost ratios. In
the planning of an incentive programme, thought should be given as to what actually
constitutes  its  primary  goal:  the  greatest  possible  accident  reduction  or  a  maximal
benefit/cost ratio. Some programmes may reduce the accident frequency only slightly,
but achieve this at a very low cost. The benefit/cost ratio may thus be higher than is true
for another programme where the ratio between benefits and costs is lower, but which is
capable of reducing the accident rate by a much greater degree. As distinct from the issue
of the size of the benefit/cost ratio, the total amount of money saved may well be much
greater in the latter case.
61 Consider  the  following  example.  Safety  programme  A can  save  700.000  Euros  at  an
implementation cost of 200,000. Programme B can save 900.000 Euros at a cost of 300,000.
In terms of  benefit/cost  A’s  ratio is  3.5,  while  B’s  ratio equals  3.0.  Thus,  against  the
benefit/cost  criterion,  A is  superior,  but  if  net  savings are considered,  the picture is
different. While programme A saves 700.000 minus 200.000, or 500.000 Euros programme
B saves 900.000 minus 300.000, that is 600.000 Euros. In terms of net savings, the larger
programme is to be preferred.
62 7.14. Research component. Like any other accident countermeasure, an incentive plan
should  not  be  introduced  without  prior  research  into  its  short-term  and  long-term
feasibility, nor without prior research into its best possible form, nor without provision
for  scientifically  adequate  evaluation  of  its  implementation  costs  and  its  observed
effectiveness in reducing the accident rate. The knowledge base of the safety research
and application community is  unlikely to grow without  proper evaluation and ready
access to the results. 
63 Without such research, the surprising effect of one particular reward programme would
never have come to light. One might perhaps think that rewards for safety simply cannot
have a negative effect, but there is one specific type in a series of California reward/
incentive programmes for the general  driving public that produced worse subsequent
driving records. In this programme, a benefit was given to drivers with no accidents on
their records without their prior knowledge of that benefit coming to them. It took the
form of an unexpected reward rather than an incentive, and this highlights the importance
of  the  distinction  for  safety  promotion  and  the  usefulness  of  careful  programme
evaluation  (Harano  &  Hubert,  1974).  The  research  that  accompanied  this  California
programme  did  go  far  enough  to  discover  the  counterproductive  effect  of  the
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unannounced reward, but, unfortunately, it did not go far enough to reveal the reasons
for this failure. At any rate, this finding, together with the significant beneficial effect of
the California incentive programme mentioned at the start of this section, highlights the
importance of the distinction between “incentive” and “reward”. The term “incentive”
refers to a pre-announced gratification or award extended to workers or drivers on the
specific condition – that is likewise pre-announced – that they do not have an accident of
their own fault within a specified future time period. A “reward” is a gratification that is
not necessarily pre- announced. It may come unexpectedly, and without recipient being
aware of conditions that had to be fulfilled.
 
8. Concluding remarks
64 In short, this article suggests that efforts should be taken to make novice drivers more
sophisticated “risk managers”.  Two things are necessary for this purpose:  better risk
recognition and lower acceptance of  accident risk.  For each,  we have made practical
suggestions.  Although it  would seem quite  plausible  that  training toward better  risk
recognition should lead to fewer accidents, this remains to be proven. The evidence for
the effectiveness  of  incentive programmes in reducing risk acceptance,  on the other
hand, is overwhelming. One of the more comprehensive literature reviews on that topic
contains the following statement: “The major finding was that every study, without
exception, found that incentives or feedback enhanced safety and/or reduced accidents
in the work place, at least in the short term. Few literature reviews find such consistent
results” (Peters, 1991).
65 One part of the evidence we have discussed comes from industrial settings, and another
part from road traffic. The types of gratification that have been extended to employees in
industry  may differ  from the  bonuses  that  can  be  offered to  drivers  in  the  general
population,  or  to  young drivers  in  particular  in  a  given jurisdiction.  The underlying
principles,  however,  are the same. Creative design of incentive programmes specially
tailored to novice drivers will be necessary. No less necessary is it that the input into
incentive programming be professional. We have already given an example of a reward
(not incentive) programme that actually turned out to be counterproductive to safety
(Harano & Hubert, 1974). Moreover, we have discussed programme characteristics that
could have made past incentive schemes more effective than in fact they were. Behaviour
modification techniques can be very powerful indeed. If they are to serve the intended
purpose,  their  implementation should be founded on the best  expertise  and insights
currently available.
66 We all know that policy makers in government and elsewhere are eager to be seen to be
doing something about a matter of social concern, such as traffic safety. If a government
wants to do more than that, and actually do something about the road accident problem,
the logic of  this article suggests that it  should use its influence to stimulate its  own
agencies,  the  insurance  and  other  industrial  companies,  cities,  driving  schools  and
parents to extend incentives to drivers for remaining without accident.
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ABSTRACTS
We know that beginner drivers are overrepresented in national road accident statistics. Drivers
under age 25 commonly account for about twice as many accidents as their proportion in the
total driver population, while their accident involvement diminishes with every additional year
of driving. We know, too, that about one-half of the overrepresentation of novice drivers in the
accident statistics is due to inexperience, and the other half to characteristics associated with
being young. Lack of experience implies a lower level of driving skills; we will argue here that
this is largely due to (a) a salient deficiency in the ability of beginner drivers to recognize risk as
more experienced drivers do, and (b) overconfidence in their ability to handle the challenges to
their  safety;  and  not  to  their  limited  vehicle-handling  skills.  We  therefore,  first  describe  a
teaching technique to help accelerate the acquisition of risk-perception skills by novice drivers.
Secondly,  we argue that  the age-related overrepresentation of  young drivers  in the accident
statistics is due to a higher-than-average level of willingness to take risks. We discuss the major
determinants of  risk acceptance and present incentives for accident-free performance as the
most effective method for bringing down the accepted level of risk while driving, and thus the
frequency of accidents.
Nous savons que les conducteurs débutants sont surreprésentés dans les statistiques nationales
d’accidents  de  la  circulation.  On recense  le  plus  souvent  deux  fois  plus  d’accidents  chez  les
conducteurs de moins de 25 ans proportionnellement à leur représentation dans la population
générale.  Ce  taux  d’accidents  diminue  à  chaque  nouvelle année  de  conduite.  Nous  savons
également qu’environ la moitié de cette surreprésentation est due à l’inexpérience et que l’autre
moitié  est  due  à  des  caractéristiques  propres  au  fait  d’être  jeune.  Le  manque  d’expérience
implique un niveau de compétences de conduite inférieur. Nous défendrons ici l’idée que cet état
de  fait  est  largement  déterminé  par  deux  caractéristiques.  Premièrement,  les  conducteurs
débutants présentent une déficience significative de l’aptitude à reconnaître les risques comme
le  font  les  conducteurs  expérimentés.  Deuxièmement,  ils  présentent  une  confiance  trop
importante dans leurs aptitudes à prendre en charge leur sécurité.  Nous soutenons dans cet
article que cette surreprésentation n’est pas due à leurs compétences limitées de manipulation
du véhicule. 
En conséquence, nous décrivons dans un premier temps une méthode d’enseignement qui irait
dans le sens d’une accélération de l’acquisition de compétences de perception des risques. Dans
un second temps, nous soutenons que la surreprésentation dans les accidents liée à l’âge des
conducteurs  est  due  à  un  niveau  d’acceptation  des  risques  supérieur  à  la  moyenne.  Nous
discutons enfin des déterminants majeurs de l’acceptation des risques et nous présentons les
incitations à des activités sans accidents en tant mesures les plus efficaces pour réduire le niveau
de risque accepté, et donc la fréquence des accidents.
INDEX
Mots-clés: niveau de risque, risque cible, accident de la circulation, jeunes conducteurs,
acceptation des risques, incitation à la sécurité
Keywords: level of risk, traffic accidents, novice drivers, risk acceptance, inexperience, target
risk, incentives for safety
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